![[Report] Report from "Rebel City": How Iranian APT Groups Surveil Their Own Citizens - CODE BLUE 2026 #codeblue_jp #codeblue2026](https://devio2024-media.developers.io/image/upload/f_auto,q_auto/c_limit,w_1200/v1794835744/eyecatch/lwaeb6mt4ljjwzxqdkhi.jpg)
[Report] Report from "Rebel City": How Iranian APT Groups Surveil Their Own Citizens - CODE BLUE 2026 #codeblue_jp #codeblue2026
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Hello, this is Usuda.
Everyone, are you doing security measures? (Greeting)
This is a report on the following session held at CODE BLUE 2026.
It was a session presenting research results on how attacks targeting a nation's citizens are carried out.
Report from the "Rebel City": How Iran's APT Group Surveils Its Own Citizens
When protesters take to the streets, there is always a shadow watching them. "CRESCENTHARVEST" is a cyber espionage campaign that weaponizes the ongoing civil unrest in Iran, targeting Persian (Farsi)-speaking people who support the protest movement with cleverly crafted "lures." What the victims receive is content disguised as urgent frontline reports from inside Iran (protest footage, street photos, and a Persian-language report from the "Rebel City"). However, two files are hidden inside, and once clicked, the machine is completely compromised through an attack chain built so seamlessly that the victim is given no cause for suspicion.
What is unfolding beneath the surface is a sophisticated operation that uses "trust" as the starting point of exploitation and "sympathy" as the attack vector. In this talk, we peel away layer by layer the campaign, which is designed to blend into the environment, lie low, and take everything, and we trace and uncover its complete attack chain, the functionality of the implant (malware), and the infrastructure fingerprints that tie it to a state-sponsored actor with a long history of relentlessly pursuing its own citizens.
Speakers: Eliad Kimhy, Subhajeet Singha
Report
Related information: Iranian protestors and dissidents targeted in cyberespionage campaign (Acronis TRU)
- Sharing what was investigated in the first half of this year
- Some information is not yet public
- A story about cases where a government hacked its own citizens
- This is a story about Iran, but similar things are done in various countries
- In Iran in particular, there are documented cases
- Iran-linked attack groups are carrying this out against citizens
- Human rights organizations outside Iran and Iranians living abroad are also targeted
- To understand this research, it is important to know that it does not stay within cyberspace
- When the government conducted espionage against citizens, it led to arrests
- People have been put in prison, and some have lost their lives
- This is not limited to Iranians
- People who do not live in Iran can also be targeted
- Violence is sometimes used
- This is not only in cyberspace
- We will look at one campaign
- It started in January
- There were demonstrations
- They tried to surveil citizens by creating a cover story using demonstrations that had already occurred
- The core of this attack is file bundling
- During this period it was difficult to obtain information from Iran
- Because the government restricted access to the Internet
- Information was hardly coming out of Iran
- There were also reports that people were trying to bypass these restrictions
- People were moving to neighboring countries such as Iraq to obtain information
- In this campaign, the victim receives a bundled file
- One of them is a document
- It contains images and videos that make it seem as if they originated from the demonstrations
- They look plausible
- Whether a journalist or a person opposed to the Iranian government, it seems real
- The analyzed document is titled as a report
- The title of this document claims it came from a rebel district of Iran
- Emojis are used, so at first glance it doesn't look like it was written by a serious person or someone participating in the demonstrations
- The first impression is that it doesn't look very serious
- What is characteristic is that there is no information at all
- There is no important information, only light content
- Just about being sad and that sort of thing
- This document is written in Farsi
- This is important for understanding the targets
- The people who read this bundle of files are those who can read Farsi
- It was a situation in which the reality of the protests was hard to come by
- Anyone who is interested becomes a target
- They were also targeted when human rights organizations were investigated in the past
- It is unclear whether it really targets people inside Iran
- It also seems to target people outside the country
- It is also unclear whether it is espionage on people inside the country
- But the ultimate goal is to steal information
- They may be interested in what kind of exchanges take place on Telegram
- The bundle also contained videos
- What kind of footage was it
- It was things like material taken from news articles
- They were videos from around January
- It is thought that not much time had passed between the start of the protests and this point
- It appears to have been set up quickly and hastily built to counter the protests
- There are two different files
- There was an LNK file
- Something used by APTs
- An LNK file that looks like a JPEG
- The shortcut executes a script
- Looking at the thumbnail, you can tell it is not an image
- Instead of being a link to another file, a command is executed
- cmd.exe is executed, and persistence is also set up
- It looks for a Windows event indicating a connection to the Internet
- Malware that starts only when connected to the Internet
- Logic that makes sense when the Internet is being controlled
- In the end, the process displays a picture, so the victim does not notice that malware was executed
- It started from the protests
- It was sent to various people and made to look legitimate
- This campaign started in an incomplete state
- It utilizes tools built into Chrome
- It binds to the Chrome app and steals keys
- The first implant goes as far as putting the stolen data into a pipe
- The next implant (DLL) decrypts and steals them
- Firefox is also targeted
- It also obtains data from Telegram and others
- It also runs a keylogger
- It is connected to a C2
- The stolen information is uploaded
- When reverse engineered, there was a ps but it did not function
- It was clear that it was hastily built
- Another artifact
- Why we could tell it was hastily built
- There was a bug
- The C2's own domain was used in the UA
- Even though they should have wanted to hide it
- They had set the wrong constant
- There are other points of concern
- Updates were made
- Links
- Comparison with other campaigns has also been done
- Connections with other Iran-linked attack groups were found
- Details are in the published blog
- There were new developments
- Some were predictable, but they evolved in a new campaign
- Previously they tried to deceive with fake images and the like
- They make decoys look legitimate
- They use various IRGC images
- Until now it was about the protests, but now it includes people in military uniforms
- What exactly they are doing with social engineering is still unclear
- They provide information that would not normally be obtainable
- That way, interested people get hooked
- They are trying to gather more information about the victims
- Using specific images, which execute when clicked
- There are also commonalities with the first campaign
- However, the details are unknown
- They are looking for information that would reveal the attackers
- Summary
- They are conducting espionage against people
- If you want to defend, understand what you are up against
- To defend, you also need to understand the risks
- Don't trust everything
- Social engineering depends on major events
- They use things that can't be obtained elsewhere
- When such things appear, an alarm should be raised
- Be especially suspicious of information that nobody else has
- People involved in espionage spend a long time building a trust relationship with the victim
- Even if you think the person you are talking to is trustworthy, be suspicious
- Passwords and the like are leaked from Chrome through app-bound mechanisms
- Research on those who steal information is advancing
- Use hardware keys and the like
Impressions
It seems we need to act carefully in everything.
This was a case that is not often shared. Let's live carefully.